Disputes, which is relied on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot constitute by itself an obstacle to the presentation of such a request. ,7
The ICJ left open the possibility that New Zealand might successfully request a resumption of the case in the event that France subsequently failed to comply with its undertakings regarding atmospheric testing thereby "affecting" the "basis" of the Judgment. The ICJ agreed with New Zealand that the term "in accordance with the provisions of the Statute" in para. 63 could not have been intended to limit New Zealand's procedural entitlements to legal procedures expressly provided for under the Statute, such as the filing of a new application, a request for an interpretation or a request for revision. The ICJ had not excluded a "special procedure" in the event that the circumstances set out in para. 63 had occurred, i.e. circumstances which "affected" the "basis" of the Judgment.
Was the basis of the 1974 Judgment affected?
The ICJ made it clear that the "special procedure" enabling the 1973 action to be continued depended entirely upon whether circumstances affecting the basis of the Judgment of 20 December 1974 had arisen. This proved to be the crux of the matter. The logical process was to define what the "basis" of the 1974 decision was. In making its decision in 1974 the ICJ had found that "for purposes of the Application, the New Zealand claim is to be interpreted as applying only to atmospheric tests, not to any other form of testing, and as applying only to atmospheric tests so conducted as to give rise to radioactive fall-out on New Zealand territory."16 6
The reference in the earlier Judgment to atmospheric tests proved crucial. The ICJ in 1995 concluded that in 1974 it had addressed the question of whether New Zealand, in its application, might have had broader objectives than the cessation of atmospheric nuclear tests. New Zealand's statements at the time evidenced a primary concern with fall-out. Therefore, the ICJ had "matched" the French undertaking with New Zealand's primary concern, namely fall-out from atmospheric testing. In its submission of 1995 New Zealand called for recognition that times had changed: "Had the Court realised in 1974 that a shift to underground testing would raise the same concerns, then, doubtless, the 'matching' would not have been made."2° The ICJ had no evidence of the detrimental effects of underground testing in 1974 and so thought the match to be adequate. Now evidence of that kind was to hand and, accordingly, the basis of the earlier judgment had been affected.21
New Zealand presented a wide range of scientific evidence to illustrate the dangers of underground testing and, in particular, the possible ramifications for the atmosphere.2
In addition it pointed to French admissions of radioactive releases resulting from previous testsz3 as well as French recognition that in 1979 a nuclear device, being tested in the South Pacific and having become stuck in the detonation shaft, had to be detonated at less than the intended depth.24 This evidence was in the end not considered by the ICJ which did not address any arguments beyond the procedural basis of New Zealand's Request.
The Precautionary Principle
In his dissenting Opinion, Judge Weeramantry expressed regret that the ICJ had not availed itself of the opportunity to consider the precautionary principle. 25 This statement was presumably in response to New Zealand's Request which called upon the ICJ to apply the principle.
The status of the precautionary principle in international law is not precisely defined.26 New Zealand, in an attempt to explain its effect, argued in its may be environmentally dangerous. 32 The common theme in these demands is for prior assessment where these risks arise. Again, however, in spite of the emphasis given in New Zealand's pleadings to the legal requirement of prior assessment, the procedural basis of the ICJ's decision precluded a full analysis of this argument.
Stephen J. A. Tierney Law School, University of Hull, UK
